In March of 1985, the Supreme Court in Tennessee v. Garner held that laws authorizing police use of deadly force to apprehend fleeing, unarmed, non-violent felony suspects violate the Fourth Amendment, and therefore states should eliminate them.
investigation shows a significant reduction (approximately sixteen percent) between the number of homicides committed before, and after the decision. This reduction was more significant in states which declared their laws regarding police use of deadly force to be unconstitutional after the Garner decision.
Evidence suggests that the reduction is due not only to a reduction in shooting fleeing felons, but also to a general reduction in police shooting. This paper discusses a mechanism that can explain the unique Tennessee v. Garner dynamic.
I. INTRODUCTION
People have criticized use of deadly force ever since police officers began carrying guns. In 1858, a New York Times editorial about a case in which a police officer shot and killed a fleeing suspect stated:
The pistols are not used in self-defence,-but to stop the men who are running away. They are considered substitutes for swift feet and long arms. Now, we doubt the propriety of employing them for such a purpose. A Policeman has no right to shoot a man for running away from him.... But what right have Policemen to carry revolvers at all? . . . We doubt very much the policy of arming our Policemen with revolvers.'
Similar arguments have persisted to the present day as the public has consistently denounced civilian homicides by police officers. People have accused officers of shooting arbitrarily, or unjustifiably, 2 and most frequently of exhibiting racism in such situations. 3 These accusations have been supported by numerous empirical studies showing that police officers kill African-Americans at a disproportionately higher rate than whites.
At the other end of the spectrum was the Defense-of-Life Rule. Under this doctrine, the only justification for using deadly force was to protect human life, either the police officer's own life or a civilian's life. 8 The only justification for risking loss of life was the preservation of another life. Following this rationale, police shooting of an unarmed fleeing suspect was unjustifiable, and unacceptable. Until recently, this was the official policy of the FBI. 9 The other two policies, the Model Penal Code (MPC) and the Forcible-Felony Rule, tried to balance the two extremes. Ultimately, however, they had the same practical result. The American Law Institute drafted the MPC to guide states that want to modify their criminal statutes and procedures. 10 The Code offered two conditions to the use of deadly force: (1) The crime involved the use or threatened.use of deadly force; and (2) There is a substantial risk that the suspect will cause death or serious bodily harm if his apprehension is delayed."
States enacting the Forcible-Felony Rule have defined specific felonies as "forcible felonies." Those states allow police to use deadly force only against people suspected of committing those felonies. Usually, forcible felonies include murder, arson, rape, kidnapping, and armed robbery.
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Critics have directed most of their criticisms towards the AnyFelony Rule, commenting that this rule is not adequate for modem times.' 3 Indeed, when the English Common Law developed this rule, the courts recognized only a few felonies, and the penalty for them was capital punishment. Moreover, police did not have firearms, so the permission to use "any means" meant actual physical force, or, at most, perhaps a sword. Ultimately, England has eliminated the rule, perhaps recognizing its inadequacy in today's world.
In the United States, many people have argued that the Any-Felony Rule is unconstitutional. They have claimed that it violates the Fourth Amendment's protection against illegal search and seizure, the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punish-ment, and the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process.' 4 Despite long standing criticism, the Any-Felony Rule was the law prior to Garner in at least twenty-four states, while some combination of the other three policies existed in the other states. 15 However, police departments usually follow their internal guidelines rather than the state's laws. Further, many of these guidelines are more restrictive than the state law. Thus, the actual police departments' policies before Garner varied significantly not only from state to state, but also within each state. 16
B. TENNESSEE V GARNER
Most jurisdictions considered police use of deadly force for all felonies to be legitimate until the Supreme Court decided Tennessee v. Garner. In that case, Garner brought a wrongful death action under the federal civil rights statute against a police officer and his respective department for the fatal shooting of Garner's son as he fled the scene of a burglary. Garner's son was unarmed at the time of the shooting. Justice White wrote for the majority, in a monumental decision: "We conclude that such force may not be used unless it is necessary to prevent the escape and the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others. "' 7 Although scholars agree that Garner-type shootings are unconstitutional,' 8 they disagree on what the phrase "the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury" means. Some believe that the decision "created a constitutional right to run for many felony suspects;"' 9 others argue that it gave police officers the right to use deadly force only to protect life. [Vol. 85
It seems that the Supreme Court equivocated. It severely restricted the Any-Felony Rule, but did not limit the use of deadly force to self-defense. Its language is similar to the MPC, but demands less by not requiring a life-threatening crime. As a result, most commentators agreed that the Court's decision in Garner would not significantly affect police conduct, 2 1 because the creation or modification of laws has never effectively modified police behavior.
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Professors Fyfe and Walker conducted a nationwide study which examined the impact of the Garner decision on policy-makers. 23 They examined legislative changes, activities of state attorneys general, and subsequent federal case law, and found that of the twenty-two states that Garner apparently affected, only four have amended their statutes to comply with the Court's holding. 24 In the remaining eighteen states, only two state attorneys general have officially advised the police of the decision. Fyfe and Walker attribute this response to legislators' fear that complying with Garner would cause voters to view them as being "soft on crime." 25 However, their study did not deal with the empirical question of whether Garner influenced the number of homicides committed by police.
The primary focus of this article is to fill that void, and investigate empirically the effect of the Garner decision on the number of homicides police officers commit nationwide.
II. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

A.
DATA SET Law enforcement agencies that report criminal homicides on the basic Uniform Crime Report (UCR) form are requested (but not required) to submit a Supplementary Homicide Report (SHR) for each month. 2 6 Agencies do not submit SHRs for months in which police do not receive any reports of homicides. The form is incident-oriented-i.e., if more than one murder occurred during the same incident, the agency fills out only one form, which covers each of the homicides. Each form details the age and race of the offenders and AM. J. PoUcE 93, 102 (1985) . victims (if known), and the weapon used. The form also details the circumstances and background of the incident, using terms such as "love triangle," "killed by babysitter," "brawl under alcohol," "argument over money," "killed while robbery," "killed while rape," "justifiable homicide-civilian," and "justifiable homicide-police."
27
The data sources for this research are SHR files for the years 1976 through 1988, as processed by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) from the original SHR master tapes provided by the FBI. The empirical analysis discussed in this article relies on "interrupted time series analysis," which estimates the impact of a specific event of social behavior. Analysts have used it to estimate the effect of political changes on the stock market, to measure the effect of installing a service fee on the number of phone calls to directory assistance, and to test and measure the impact of experimental psychological treatment. The most intensive use, however, has been to test the influence of new laws on changing public behavior. 3 ' Under this method, analysts measure the average number of ob- 685-92 (1989) . The main problem in the "circumstances" variable seems to be that the same circumstances can be interpreted in more than one way. See generally Colin Loftin, The Validity of Robbery-Murder Classifications in Baltimore 1 VIOLENCE & VITIMS 191, 191-204 (1986) . & CRIMINOLOGY 546 (1979) . For a comprehensive review on the SHR measure of police homicides, see DEADLY FORCE: PRAcrrrioNER's DESK REFERENCE, supra note 9, at 32-37.
31 DAVID MCDOWALL ET AL., INTERRUPTED TIME SERIES ANALYSIS 10-11 (1980). servations in a time unit, before and after a specific event. If the event influenced social behavior, these averages should be different. However, some trends which are not correlated to the tested event may influence the time series' behavior. For example, some commentators have suggested that, even before Garner, the trend in justifiable homicides by police was declining. 3 2 Thus, any conclusion based only on average differences may be incorrect. One way to avoid this is to build a mathematical model which takes into account trends and correlations in the data. After controlling for those, analysts may properly measure the averages and calculate the influence of the event.
The most popular way to estimate the effect of a specific event for this purpose is through the use of Auto Regressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) models. 3 3 The advantage of ARIMA models (compared with regression models) is that they are more sensitive to the data, rather than the specific variables chosen by theory. One problem, however, is that the ARIMA models may not be sensitive enough to find a correlation between two variables. If, however, researchers do find a correlation, they can rely on it conservatively.
An accurate model using ARIMA requires researchers to first identify the reasonable model, then estimate the parameters for that model, and then conduct an appropriate diagnosis of the model. Once an appropriate model is built, analysts may add the intervention component and test its influence on the model. Using an ARIMA model, the influence of Garner on the number of homicides committed by police nationwide was tested. 3 5 Also, Garnets influence on various states was tested. The author divided the data into two groups: states whose deadly force laws were declared unconstitutional ("unconstitutional states"); and states whose laws 385 (3d ed. 1988) . Technically, the author identifies the model using the auto-correlation-function (ACF) and the partial-auto-correlationfunction (PACF). The parameters must lie within the bounds of stationarity-invertability, and be statistically significant, to be considered adequate. Two tests are usually applied to verify the estimated model; the residuals of the ACF must describe white noise (without spikes in key lags), and the Q-statistic must be insignificant. 35 The study examined a total of 4733 cases from January 1976 to December 1988.
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were adequate before Garner ("constitutional states"). The study measured Garner's influence on each of these groups to determine whether it was greater on one than on the other.
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C. VERIFICATION TESTS
To avoid the possibility that a variable which is unrelated to Garner affected the results, the author first determined the total number of homicides (including justifiable) committed by police during the same time period. If the measurement process is accurate, the number of total homicides before and after Garner should not differ. Also, the author measured the influence of Garner on the ratio of police homicides to the total number of criminal homicides. If the data were faulty, the ratio between them would be influenced to a lesser extent than the individual categories.
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These two validations are important because of the correlation between the number of police homicides and the number of criminal homicides. 3 8 If, despite this connection, the number of police homicides decreased, while the number of criminal homicides remained constant, the Garner decision most likely influenced that reduction.
III. FINDINGS
A.
THE REDUCTION IN POLICE HOMICIDES Graph 13 9 shows the incidence of police homicides over time. The line in the middle is the intervention point (the month of the Garner decision). As the graph indicates, the data does not contain an outlier.
36 The study actually looks at the influence of Garner on police shooting in general and not only at cases that resulted in death. However, the number of homicides is a direct result of the number of shootings. According to the SHR, from the total of 4733 police homicides used for this study, 4670 (98.67%) were the results of shooting. As stated, analysts cannot add the intervention component until they identify the right statistical model for the data. As Graph 2, which shows the auto-correlation-function (ACF), and Graph 3, which shows the partial-auto-correlation-function (PACF) of the original data illustrate, the most appropriate model is the auto-regressive model of order 1. Graph 4 shows the auto-correlation-function (AGF), and Graph 5 shows the partial auto-correlation-function (PACF) of this model.
The model passes the diagnostic stage because there are no significant values in key lags in any graphs; the parameter estimates are within the permitted boundaries; and the Q-test is not significant.
40
Thus, this model is appropriate to test the intervention-i.e., the effect of the Garner decision on police homicides. Table 1 includes the parameters for the intervention model for the number of police homicides each month ("police" variable), and the ratio of police homicides to criminal homicides ("ratio" variable). .12 L-B. Q 90. - - Based on the first order component for the police variable, the full equation is: Ht = 29.43 + Ht-1*0.28 -4.7*1 + At where I is a dummy variable representing the time before and after the intervention, and At is the random component.
PLOT OF AUTOCORRELATIONS
--------------------------------------------------
+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----
--------------------------------------------------
These results indicate that police homicides decreased from 29.43 per month to 24.68 following the Court's decision in Garner This is a monthly average of 4.75, a reduction of approximately sixteen (16.15) percent. Table 1 also includes the parameters for the "ratio" variable, which represents the ratio between police homicides and criminal homicides. The estimate for the first order component is 0.32, with a T-ratio of 4.19. The mean of the ratio between police homicides and criminal homicides is 1.91. The intervention component is -0.26, with a T-ratio of -2.56. This means that after Garner, the percentage of police homicides that contributed to the total number of homicides fell [Vol. 85
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by approximately 0.26%. As before, the full equation is:
Ratio t = 1.91 + Ratiot-1*0.32 -0.26*1 + At The total reduction of the "ratio" variable between police homicides and criminal homicides decreased by 13.55% following the Garner decision.
The difference between the police homicide reduction (16.15%) and the ratio reduction (13.55%) is due to variation in the criminal homicides number and not in the police homicides number. As Table 1 illustrates, the mean of police homicides in the first-third of the third period (29.54) is almost the same as in the second-third (29.88), while the ratio mean went down from 1.95 in the first-third to 1.90 in the second-third. In both cases, however, the big reduction occurred in the third-third (each third represents 52 months out of the sample of 156. The intervention point is seven months after the beginning of the third-third).
B.
"CONSTITUTIONAL" AND "UNCONSTITUTIONAL" STATES Table 2 summarizes three intervention variables in addition to the "police" and "ratio" variables.
The first variable is the total number of criminal homicides ("total" variable). The results in Table 2 show that the T-ratio of the intervention is -0.72, so even the small reduction of 2.9% is not valid. This suggests that there was no significant intervention in the total homicides as reported in the Supplementary Homicide Report, and therefore, the results of this study are not an outcome of measurement variability. Summarizes the results of the intervention for five other variables: 'Total'-the number of criminal homicides. 'State'-the number of police homicides in states whose laws were influenced by the Garner decision. 'Notstate'-the number of police homicides in states whose laws were not influenced by the Garner decision. Size of intervention component indicates the number of homicides reduced by the decision. A mean before intervention is the mean predicted by the model in the assumption that the intervention made a difference. Table 2 indicates that the Garner decision influenced both the constitutional and unconstitutional states. In the unconstitutional states (termed "State" in Table 2 ), the reduction was an average of 1994] 2.16 homicides following the Garner decision; in constitutional states (termed "Notstate"), the reduction was 2.64 homicides following Garner. Clearly, however, the decision in Gamer had a greater influence on the unconstitutional states than the constitutional ones. Because of the differences in the number of police homicides to start with, the percentage reduction was different. In the constitutional states, the number of homicides declined by approximately thirteen percent (-12.96% ). In the unconstitutional states the reduction was approximately twenty-four percent (23.80%).
C. SUB-CIRCUMSTANCES
TABTE 3. Table 3 shows the total and monthly means for each sub-circumstances category.
ported as "accidental" jumped from 4.5% to 9.2%.42 The Memphis Police Department reported similar results. Professors Sparger and Giacopassi reported that after a policy change, the number of shootings classified as "apprehend suspect" declined by 58.6% while the rate of "defend life" increased 91.5%. 4 3 These changes in Memphis occurred despite the fact that there was no reduction in the total amount of police shootings.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. THE FACTS Three conclusions seem to be self-evident from the data presented here. The first, and most important one is that Garner had a clear effect on justifiable police homicides. It reduced the total number of police homicides by approximately sixty homicides a year (more than sixteen percent). Second, Garner had an influence in both unconstitutional states and constitutional states. The magnitude of the reduction, however, was greater in unconstitutional states. Finally, Garner influenced not only a reduction in the number of police shootings of fleeing felons, but of all shootings, even those that are not correlated to defending life. This conclusion, however, needs more empirical support before it can be unequivocally accepted. The impact of Garner is surprising. Even before Garner, many police departments had already restricted their guidelines, and repealed the Any-Felony Rule. Accordingly, observers did not expect Garner to have such a dramatic impact. 44 A recent study on the influence of the Garner decision on the Memphis Police Department (MPD) may explain this phenomenon. Sparger & Giacopassi investigated MPD shootings in three different periods: 1969-1974; 1980-1984; 1985-1989. 45 They concluded that Garner definitely reduced police shootings. 46 Even though Memphis' policy before Garner was consistent with the Supreme Court's decision, the police restricted the policy even further after the decision. In fact, the policy after Garner emphasized "that deadly force should be used only as a last resort to protect life, not merely to apprehend fleeing dangerous felons." This tendency by police departments to restrict their shooting guidelines beyond legal requirements is not a new one. Kenneth Matulia, who conducted a survey among fifty-seven big city police departments, wrote that "the individual police department rules . . . generally place a more restrictive standard of conduct than permitted by law." '48 Professors Geller and Scott also described a tendency in law enforcement agencies to move towards guidelines which were more restrictive than Garner required.
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Thus, the adoption of more restricted policies by police departments nationwide after the Court's decision in Garner seems to have caused the reduction in police homicides. This is consistent with the evidence that restricted policies can reduce police shootings, and therefore police homicides. 50 The magnitude of the change can explain the differences in reduction between the unconstitutional states (23.8% reduction in police homicides), and the constitutional states (12.96% reduction). The modifications which should have been made in department policies were higher in states that had the AnyFelony Rule than in states which did not. As a result, Garner's influence was more accentuated in the unconstitutional states. The self-restrictions on police behavior concerning deadly force were not only the result of good will but were also a political necessity. Police shootings of civilians have huge social costs, including riots. 5 ' This has happened not only in the United States but in other nations too, 5 2 and it is almost anticipated in some neighborhoods. Aside from public disturbances, police use of deadly force often spawns civil lawsuits. 53 The fear of riots and law suits may explain why mayors and police chiefs prefer to severely limit the instances in which their officers may use deadly force.
In sum, the Garner decision seems to have reduced police homicides directly (by reducing police shooting at fleeing felons), and indirectly (by influencing police departments to reduce and modify their guidelines beyond Garner to appear just and sensitive to the public). As a result, all police shooting unrelated to protecting life seems to be declining.
C. SOME UNDESIRABLE OUTCOMES
Until the 1960s, the number of homicides in the United States was relatively stable. 5 4 There were fewer homicides then there are today, and the percentage of homicides which qualified asjustifiable (by police or civilians) was much higher than today. As Professor Brearley wrote in 1932, "it may be safely concluded that justifiable homicides comprise from one-fourth to one-third of the total number of slayings." 5 These statistics suggest that the more society views police and civilian homicides as justifiable, the more criminals these homicides deter. Professor Cloninger investigated the connection between police homicides and the crime rate in fifty cities. 56 He found that nonhomicide violent crime rates are inversely related to the police's lethal 51 For a list of occasions where shooting or other incidence between police officers and civilians caused rioting, see DEADLY FoRCE: A PRAasrmONER's DEsK REFERENCE, supra note 9, at 1-14.
52 Any incident where a police officer causes some unnecessary harm to civilians can cause riots. For example, on July 17, 1992, in Bristol, England, two local men died in a collision with a police car after they had stolen a police motorcycle. 
59-69 (1991).
response rate, and concluded that police use of deadly force has a deterrent effect on the crime rate.
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Further, police officers believe that the threat of deadly force deters felony criminals, and that harsh statutory limitations on police discretion is dangerous. 58 In fact, some officers have already complained that the Garner decision, and resulting restrictive practices, have made their work frustrating and more dangerous. 59 Arguably, Justice O'Connor recognized this concern in her dissenting opinion: "I cannot accept the majority's creation of a constitutional right to flight for burglary suspects seeking to avoid capture at the scene of the crime." 60 The majority of the Court considered this concern, but decided that the deterrent effect does notjustify the risk of unnecessary police homicides. While the data is not sufficient to answer the empirical questions, the possibility that the Court's decision in Garner eroded the deterrent effect of police homicide should be considered in any evaluation of Garne's influence.
D. SUMMARY
Despite suspicion about the ability of the Supreme Court to change police discretion, 6 1 the Garner decision demonstrates that a decision can have a strong effect on police behavior. However, more research is needed on the local level to determine whether police departments have changed their policies to comply with Garner. This would provide a better understanding of the types of policies that can influence police use of deadly force. [Vol. 85
